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FOREWORD
Regional trade agreements (RTA) have become a distinctive feature of the international trading 
landscape.  Their number has increased significantly in recent years, as World Trade Organization 
(WTO) member countries continue to pursue these agreements. Some 200-odd agreements have been 
notified to the WTO but their number may be actually higher, as some agreements are never notified 
to the multilateral bodies and many more are under negotiation. As a result, more and more trade is 
now covered by such preferential deals, prompting many analysts to suggest that RTAs are becoming 
the norm rather than the exception.
Many regional pacts contain obligations that go beyond existing multilateral commitments, and others 
deal with areas not yet included in the WTO, such as investment and competition policies, as well 
as labour and environment issues. Regional and bilateral agreements between countries at different 
stages of development have become commonplace, as have attempts to form region-wide economic 
areas by dismantling existing trade and investment barriers, an objective that figures prominently in 
East Asian countries’ trade strategies.
Yet the effects of RTAs on the multilateral trading system are still unclear, as is their impact on trade 
and sustainable development. RTAs represent a departure from the basic non-discrimination principle 
of the WTO, and decrease the transparency of global trade rules, as traders are subject to multiple, 
sometime conflicting requirements. This is particularly the case in relation to rules of origin, which 
can be extremely complex and often vary in agreements concluded by the same countries. Also, the 
case that WTO-plus commitments enhance sustainable development is far from proven, and it is not 
readily apparent whether RTAs enhance trade rather than divert it.
However, developed and developing countries alike continue to engage in RTA negotiations, and 
this tendency seems to have been intensified recently due to the slow pace of progress in the 
multilateral trade negotiations of the Doha Round. Countries feel the pressure of competitive 
regional liberalisation and accelerate their searches for new markets. Thus, while most countries 
continue to formally declare their commitment to the multilateral trading system and to the 
successful conclusion of the Doha negotiations, for many bilateral deals are taking precedence. 
Some countries have concluded so many RTAs that their engagement at the multilateral levels is 
becoming little more than a theoretical proposition.
Thus, gaining a better understanding of the workings of RTAs and their impact on the multilateral 
trading system is a key concern of trade analysts and practitioners. Current WTO rules on regional 
agreements, mainly written in the late 1940s, do not seem well equipped to deal with today’s web of 
RTAs. Economists dispute whether RTAs create or divert trade, and political scientists try to explain 
the resurgence of RTAs by a mix of economic, political and security considerations. In some cases, the 
fear of losing existing unilateral non-reciprocal trade preferences provides the rationale for launching 
RTA negotiations, as is the case of the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) negotiations between 
the European Union and its former colonies in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP). Many worry 
about the systemic impact of RTAs and dispute whether they should be considered “building blocks” to 
a stronger and freer international trading system or rather “stumbling blocks” that erode multilateral 
rules and disciplines. 
There are many interpretations of the dynamic relationship between RTAs and the WTO. The fact 
remains, however, that RTAs are here to stay. If anything, they will continue to increase in number 
in the coming years. They are already an integral part of the international trade framework, and 
influence the behaviour of governments and traders. They co-exist with the multilateral trading 
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system and impact it in manners that have yet to be fully understood. Regional rules often replicate 
multilateral disciplines, but sometimes go beyond them by going deeper into some commitments, 
with implications for sustainable development that need to be highlighted. And it may well be that 
some regional disciplines might be able to find their way into the multilateral framework.
It is for these reasons that ICTSD has decided to initiate a research, dialogue and information 
programme whose main purpose is to contribute to filling in these knowledge gaps and gaining a 
better understanding of the evolving reality of RTAs and their interaction with the multilateral 
trading system.
This issue paper, titled “Legal and Systemic Contested issues in Economic Partnership Agreements 
(EPAs) and WTO Rules: Which Way Now?”, and written by Dr Cosmas Milton Obote O’chieng, is a 
contribution to this process. The paper provides a legal analysis of some systemic issues regarding the 
relationship between the WTO and EPAs.  Some of these issues include the following:
• The application of the Most Favourable Nation Clause, Article XXIV of GATT and its relationship 
with EPAs, 
• The effects of the “standstill” clause on bound or applied tariff rates applied to ACP countries 
by WTO members,
• The political and legal effects of the “Non-Execution Clause” in EPAs;
• The articulation of the dispute settlement mechanisms of EPAs and their interactions with the 
WTO one.
The paper concludes with a series of legal recommendations that could be useful to all stakeholders 
in understanding the stakes involved in the EPA negotiations.
We hope that this paper, together with the others in this series on regional agreements, will clarify 
some of the many questions posed by RTAs, and help promote a better understanding of the workings 
of RTAs and how the deals interact with the multilateral trading system.
Ricardo Meléndez-Ortiz 
Chief Executive, ICTSD
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This study was commissioned by the Regionalism and Services Department of the International Centre 
for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) to examine contested issues in the interim Economic 
Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the European Union (EU) and the African, Caribbean and 
Pacific (ACP) countries. The study examined the legal and developmental implications of five 
fundamental provisions of the EPAs: interpretation of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
Article XXIV, particularly the understanding of ‘substantially all trade’ (SAT) and ‘reasonable period 
of time’ (RPT); clauses on ‘most favoured nation’ (MFN) treatment; ‘standstill’; ‘dispute settlement’; 
and ‘non-execution’. 
The findings of this study are based on textual analyses of the EPA of the Caribbean Forum (CARIFORUM), 
and the interim EPAs of the East African Community (EAC), the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC), countries in Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA), countries of the Pacific ACP 
(PACP), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Monetary and Economic 
Community of Central Africa (CEMAC). 
The interim EPAs have been ‘initialled’ and contain ‘rendez-vous’ clauses allowing for further 
negotiations of some items whilst the CARIFORUM is a fully concluded EPA.
The study finds that all the EPAs contain more restrictive legal provisions than necessary for World 
Trade Organization (WTO) compatibility or desirable in terms of the development, financial and trade 
needs of ACP countries. Where WTO compatibility is required (e.g. compliance with GATT Article 
XXIV), in several respects, the EPAs are relatively more restrictive than many pre-existing Free Trade 
Agreements (FTAs) involving the EU, the United States of America (US) and others, for example: the 
Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) between the EU and South Africa, and EU-
Chile, EU-Mexico, US-Australia, Thailand-Australia, Thailand-New Zealand and Canada-Chile FTAs. 
The EPA clauses on MFN treatment and standstill are not only legally WTO-plus, but constitute the first 
time the EU is employing these provisions in its trade relations with developing countries. The TDCA 
and EU-Chile, EU-Mexico and EU-Morocco FTAs contain no such provisions. 
The WTO-plus provisions of EPAs and their restrictive interpretations of WTO rules pose serious systemic 
challenges to the multilateral trading system, particularly the purposes and functions of the Enabling 
Clause and the underlying principle of ‘special and differential treatment’ (SDT). Overall, the legal 
design of the EPAs undermines that principle and diminishes the ‘policy space’ or ‘flexibility’ available 
to ACP EPAs in dealing with challenges inherent in their levels of economic development such as 
the need for infant industry protection, revenues from trade taxes, etc. Specifically, the EPA MFN 
clause threatens to undermine the role of the Enabling Clause in governing South-South trade. It also 
imposes unnecessary constraints on trade relations between ACP countries and other industrialized 
countries.
The study makes six recommendations. 
1. African, Caribbean and Pacific countries should seek the elimination of the MFN clause in the final 
negotiations on full EPAs. Failing that, ‘major trading economies’ in the MFN provisions should be 
redefined to exclude developing countries. Any definition of major trading economies that includes 
developing countries potentially conflicts with the purposes and functions of the Enabling Clause 
in governing South-South trade. 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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2. The Economic Partnership Agreement standstill clause is a WTO-plus provision. It would be in 
the development, financial and trade interests of ACP countries to seek its elimination in the 
final negotiations on full EPAs. A second best alternative in this respect would be for the ACP 
countries to freeze their tariffs at bound rather than applied levels and freeze tariffs relating only 
to products committed for liberalization as opposed to all products as provided for in some interim 
EPAs.
3. Consistent with many other FTAs (e.g. EU-Chile, EU-Czech, EU-Morocco, EU-South Africa, US-
Australia, US-Morocco) and, in the interests of their development, trade and financial needs, 
ACP countries should consider excluding any sensitive sectors or products from liberalization 
commitments. These should be defined in both ‘static’ (short term, e.g. food security, infant 
industry protection) or ‘dynamic’ (long term, e.g. industrial or national development) terms. This 
could be considerably more than their present exclusions in interim EPAs. 
4. For purposes of compliance with GATT Article XXIV, 80 percent liberalization by ACP countries 
(either in regional groupings or as individual countries in bilateral EPAs) within 15 years would 
appear to suffice for compatibility with GATT Article XXIV, if the EU liberalizes 100 percent of its 
trade with any given ACP country configuration at the outset. This would amount to 90 percent 
coverage of the trade between the parties in 15 years.  All the interim EPAs and the CARIFORUM 
EPA provide for at least 80 percent liberalization within 15 years by the ACP bloc and 100 percent 
immediate liberalization by the EU, barring transitory periods for rice and sugar. Any liberalization 
commitment by the ACP group beyond the 80 percent 15-year mark would appear deeper than 
legally necessary compared to many prevailing FTAs.  In the interests of their development, trade 
and financial needs, these countries could seek indefinite phase-out periods for liberalization 
commitments beyond the 80 percent 15-year watershed or subject such commitments to tariff 
reduction rather than elimination.  This would be consistent with other North-South FTAs, 
particularly those involving the US.
5. Economic Partnership Agreement dispute settlement (EPA DS) should be no stricter than WTO 
dispute settlement (WTO DS). Developing countries face considerable challenges utilizing the WTO 
DS system. A more stringent system than the WTO’s would only make things worse for the ACP 
countries. They could consider choice of forum provisions in EPA dispute settlement systems with 
the WTO system as a potential alternative option. This could enhance the symmetry of the EPA DS 
mechanism given the economic disparities between the EU and the ACP regions. 
6. If ACP countries choose to conclude agreements on services and investments, it would be in 
their development, trade and financial interests to demand special and differential treatment as 
provided by the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) Article V in respect of services.  As 
GATS provides for MFN treatment in Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs), it would also be in their 
interests to consider the items they might exempt from MFN provisions of the GATS. The ACP 
countries would also benefit from an MFN clause with both pre- and post-establishment provisions 
as inspired by GATS Article II.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The recently initialled or concluded Economic 
Partnership Agreements between the EU and 
a number of the ACP countries (40 out of 
76) are the successors to the Lomé/Cotonou 
preferences scheme that governed EU-ACP 
countries’ trade between 1975 and 2007. The 
Lomé Conventions were a special form of the 
EU’s Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). 
They put ACP countries at the top of the pyramid 
of preferences granted by the EU to developing 
countries from 1975 to 2001, when the Cotonou 
Partnership Agreement (CPA) replaced them. 
A temporary WTO Waiver granted until 31 
December 2007 allowed the CPA to extend most 
of the Lomé provisions in the intervening period 
as ‘Cotonou preferences’. 
Through the CPA, the EU and the ACP group 
committed to the establishment of new WTO-
compatible trade arrangements by 1 January 
2008. These are the EPAs. They differ from 
the Lomé/Cotonou regime in two important 
respects. Firstly, whilst the Lomé/Cotonou 
regimes were non-reciprocal preferential market 
access agreements in favour of the ACP regions, 
EPAs are FTAs and embody reciprocity in EU-
ACP country trade in line with the provisions of 
GATT Article XXIV on FTAs and customs unions. 
Secondly, unlike Lomé, EPAs contain provisions 
for concluding agreements on services, which 
would bring them under the jurisdiction of GATS 
Article V (Abass, 2004; Ochieng, 2007). 
The differences between the Lomé/Cotonou and 
the EPA trade regimes are captured in articles 
outlining their founding principles. Article 7 of 
the first Lomé Convention (Lomé 1) established 
the principle of non-reciprocity in trade between 
the EU and the ACP group of countries:
In view of their present development 
needs, the ACP shall not be required, 
for the duration of this Convention, to 
assume, in respect of imports of products 
originating in the Community, obligations 
corresponding to the commitments 
entered into by the Community in respect 
of imports of the products originating in 
the ACP States.
This principle was included in successive Lomé 
Conventions. Articles 36.1 and 37.7 of the CPA 
introduce the principle of reciprocity in trade 
between the EU and ACP countries. Article 
36.1 (on modalities) states:
the Parties agree to conclude new World 
Trade Organization (WTO) compatible 
trading agreements, removing progres-
sively barriers to trade between them 
and enhancing cooperation in all areas 
relevant to trade.
Despite introducing the principle of reciprocity 
in trade, the CPA provided for SDT for all ACP 
countries. Article 35.5 of the CPA states:
Parties reaffirm their attachment to  
ensuring special and differential treat-
ment for all ACP countries and to 
maintaining special treatment for ACP 
least developed countries (LDCs) and to 
taking due account of the vulnerability of 
small, landlocked and island countries.
Article 37.7 states:
Negotiations shall take account of the level 
of development and the socioeconomic 
impact of trade measures on ACP countries, 
and their capacity to adapt and adjust 
their economies to the liberalisation 
process. Negotiations will therefore 
be flexible as possible in establishing 
the duration of a sufficient transitional 
period, the final product coverage, 
taking into account sensitive sectors, 
and the degree of asymmetry in terms of 
timetable for tariff dismantlement, while 
remaining in conformity with WTO rules 
then prevailing. 
Article 41.2 underlines the “need for special 
and differential treatment to ACP suppliers of 
services.” 
The CPA’s provisions on reciprocity and SDT 
reflect the parties’ intention to establish 
WTO-compatible trade arrangements without 
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jeopardising the development, financial and 
trade interests of ACP countries. This intention 
might have been clear as the various Articles 
of the CPA on EPAs illustrate, but it was also 
fraught with tension similar to that inherent 
within the WTO between the principle of 
reciprocity and SDT. This tension has been at 
the heart of the differences between the EU 
and ACP countries over the negotiations of 
the EPAs since 2002. These differences reflect 
divergent perspectives over what type of 
EPAs would meet WTO compatibility without 
constraining the development, financial and 
trade needs of ACP countries. 
The compatibility of the EPAs with WTO 
rules has been of paramount importance 
because the evolution of the EPAs was partly 
influenced by the legal challenges to the 
Lomé preferences through the European Com-
munity banana disputes of the 1990s (see 
WTO 1997a, 1997b for Panel and Appellate 
Board Rulings, respectively). WTO rulings 
on these disputes (WTO, 1997a, 1997b) cast 
doubt on the compatibility of aspects of the 
preferences with WTO rules and when the 
Fourth Lomé Convention expired in 1999 (it 
had been signed on 15 December 1989 for a 
period of 10 years) the EU-ACP bloc had to 
seek a WTO waiver to allow the continuation 
of the preferences under the CPA trade regime 
whilst they sought a more permanent and WTO 
compatible trading arrangement. This waiver 
was granted on 14 November 2001 on the 
sidelines of the Doha Ministerial Conference 
(hence the ‘Doha Waiver’).  
It is within this legal context (i.e. European 
Community banana disputes) that Article 37 
(6) of the CPA provided for the establishment 
of WTO compatible trade agreements between 
the EU and six regional groupings of ACP 
countries by 1 January 2008, which became 
known as EPAs.  After some contestation (not 
yet entirely resolved, as discussed in the rest 
of this article), WTO compatibility came to be 
understood by the EU, and a majority of ACP 
countries, as compliance with Article XXIV of 
GATT (on Regional Trade Agreements here used 
interchangeably with Free Trade Agreements). 
A section of the ACP group opposed to FTAs 
between developed and developing countries 
contested this interpretation and maintained 
that WTO compliance could also be achieved 
through a non-reciprocal trade agreement 
based on the Enabling Clause.  
Legally, a non-reciprocal trade arrangement 
compatible with WTO rules was possible and 
the CPA provided for such an alternative under 
Article 37.7. Developmentally, however, the EU 
and others questioned the benefits of another 
non-reciprocal trade arrangement with the ACP 
countries. Trade preferences like those that 
would be possible under the Enabling Clause 
have increasingly come under severe criticism 
regarding their developmental impacts. 
These range from the increasing impact of 
preferences erosion as a result of multilateral 
and unilateral trade liberalization; exclusion 
of import-sensitive products and competitive-
need products from beneficiary countries; 
restrictive rules of origin; and political 
conditionality to short-termism, as a result of, 
among others, graduation of certain products, 
sectors or countries (Grossman and Sykes, 
2005; Hoekman and Proswe, 2005). 
For these reasons, FTAs between the EU and 
ACP regions (i.e. EPAs) were not only dictated 
by legal considerations. Economically, there 
were those like the EU who held that FTAs 
between the EU and ACP countries would 
enhance competition and economic efficiency 
within ACP economies by getting rid of 
economically inefficient protectionism (World 
Bank, 2008). Of course, for sceptics of FTAs 
between developed and developing countries, 
the criticisms of non-reciprocal trade 
preferences might be valid, but that does not 
mean that they must necessarily be replaced 
by FTAs. They could as well be reformed to 
address many of their shortcomings.
The Cotonou Partnership Agreement accom-
modated both schools of thought by making 
provisions for both EPAs and non-reciprocal 
alternatives to EPAs. In effect, EPAs would be 
the main instrument for the pursuit of durable 
WTO-compatible trade relations between the 
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EU and the ACP regions whilst non-reciprocal 
regimes (e.g. some form of generalized 
system of preferences) could serve as an 
alternative to those countries unwilling to 
sign on to EPAs. Whilst Article 36.1 of the CPA 
provides for the EPAs to be established under 
GATT Article XXIV (i.e. as FTAs), at least three 
other Articles of the CPA seek to moderate this 
through SDT provisions, including an option 
for non-reciprocal alternatives for non-least 
developed countries (LDCs) unwilling to sign 
on to EPAs. Articles 35.5, 37.7 and 41.2 assert 
the primacy of development-orientation of 
the EPAs through explicit provisions for SDT 
including, notably, a commitment by the EU 
to provide non-reciprocal trade alternatives 
to non-LDCs in the ACP regions that are 
unwilling to conclude EPAs (Article 37.7). 
Article 35.5 of the CPA provides for the parties 
to ensure SDT for all ACP countries and to 
take due account of the vulnerability of small, 
landlocked and island countries. Article 37.7 
provides for EPA negotiations to consider the 
level of development and socio-economic 
impact of trade measures on ACP countries, 
and their capacity to adapt and adjust their 
economies to liberalization. It also provides 
for the EU to offer alternatives to EPAs for 
non-LDCs in the ACP bloc that are unable or 
unwilling to conclude EPAs. Such an alternative 
already existed for LDCs in the ACP bloc in the 
form of the EU’s ‘Everything But Arms’ (EBA) 
preferential scheme.  As already mentioned, 
Article 41.2 provided for SDT in favour of ACP 
suppliers of services. 
The CPA is, of course, a cooperation agreement 
and is best examined under the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties. Its provisions 
cannot be held to be on a par with the legal 
provisions of the WTO and that is not the 
intention of this study. However, because the 
CPA provides the framework for the negotiations 
of the EPAs, it offers a relevant context within 
which the contested issues within the EPAs can 
be understood. This is the overall context within 
which the provisions of the CPA are discussed 
throughout this study.
The CPA provided for the EPAs to be 
negotiated and concluded between 2002 and 
2007. However, fundamental disagreements 
over their design and scope prevented the 
conclusion of all but one regional EPA – the 
CARIFORUM EPA between the EU and all 
Caribbean countries – within this timeframe. 
The ACP countries’ basic contestation was that 
the EU’s EPA proposals were legally WTO-plus 
and in several respects were inconsistent with 
the provisions of the CPA – either going beyond 
what was provided for by the CPA or failing to 
meet provisions (usually SDT) of the CPA. 
These disagreements, here referred to as 
‘first-generation disagreements’ centred on 
the meaning of WTO compatibility, in particular, 
the interpretation of GATT Article XXIV on 
SAT and RPT; flexibility or in respect of SDT; 
whether to conclude agreements only on trade 
in goods or whether to conclude agreements 
on services and ‘Singapore issues’; whether 
to conclude agreements with regional groups 
of countries or to adopt variable geometry, 
multiple speed approaches; and whether to 
seek another WTO waiver to allow more time 
for negotiating EPAs (African Union, 2008; 
Ochieng, 2007; Stevens et al, 2008; WTO 
2002a, 2004a, 2005). 
Differences on these perspectives within the 
ACP bloc and between the ACP regions and 
the EU meant that none of these options 
was seriously considered before the expiry 
of the Doha Waiver. For example, some ACP 
countries (e.g. the Caribbean) had no problems 
concluding agreements on services and 
investment whilst others had serious questions. 
Some African countries favoured a variable 
geometry multiple approach to negotiations, 
whilst others preferred negotiating under 
established regional economic community 
structures, etc. (ACP-EC, 2003; Ochieng, 
2007). Further, the EU always held that any 
discussion on alternatives would make sense 
only after serious deliberations on the scope 
and design of the EPAs. Parallel discussions on 
alternatives risked diverting resources (both 
human and time) from the EPA negotiations.  
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Whilst the EU had long preferred negotiating 
the EPAs on a regional rather than bilateral 
basis (i.e. with regional groupings of ACP 
countries as opposed to individual ACP states), 
as 2007 drew to a close, it changed tact and 
opted to negotiate with any country or group of 
countries willing to do so.  Ultimately, a two-
tier system for concluding the EPAs emerged: 
a fully completed EPA with the CARIFORUM 
and initialling interim or provisional EPAs 
with individual and/or groups of ACP countries 
as follows: 
a) East African Community (EAC): Burundi, 
Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda; 
b) SADC: Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, 
Namibia and Swaziland; 
c) ESA: Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, 
Seychelles and Zimbabwe; 
d) PACP: Papua New Guinea and Fiji; 
e) Ghana EPA: in the interim, a bilateral EPA 
with the EU with the expectation that other 
ECOWAS members would join in the future;
f) Côte d’Ivoire EPA: in the interim, a bilateral 
EPA with the EU with the expectation of 
future ECOWAS expansion;
g) Cameroon EPA: in the interim, a bilateral 
EPA with the EU with the expectation that 
other members of CEMAC would join later.
Out of the 76 ACP countries, 40 agreed to 
either conclude or initial an EPA. Among 
those that did not conclude an agreement 
were: 
• LDCs (Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape 
Verde, Chad, Central African Republic, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, 
Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Kiribati, Liberia, 
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Samoa, Sao 
Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, 
Solomon Islands, Sudan, Togo, Tuvalu, 
Vanuatu, Zambia); and
• non-LDCs (Congo, Cook Islands, Federation 
of Micronesia, Gabon, Marshall Islands, 
Nauru, Nigeria, Niue, Palau and Tonga). 
The LDCs that did not conclude or initial an 
EPA automatically reverted to the EU’s EBA 
initiative to which they were eligible. This 
initiative offers duty free and quota free access 
to the EU market for all products from LDCs 
except arms. The non-LDCs faced losing their 
preferential access to the EU on terms they 
had enjoyed through the Lomé and Cotonou 
preferences. Of the 14 non-LDCs in Africa, 10 
initialled interim EPAs (Botswana, Cameroon, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Namibia, 
Seychelles, Swaziland and Zimbabwe). 
However, some like Gabon and Nigeria 
refused to conclude or initial an EPA falling 
back instead on the spirit of Article 37.7 of 
the CPA and asking the EU to provide them 
an equivalent alternative – the EU’s GSP+ 
scheme (available to selected non-LDC 
developing countries). The EU’s GSP+ scheme 
is arguably preferentially more favourable 
than its standard GSP scheme available 
to all developing countries, but was less 
favourable than the Cotonou preferences or 
the EBA initiative (Stevens et al, 2008; World 
Bank, 2008). 
Following the expiry of the Cotonou 
preferences, Gabon, Nigeria and other non-
LDCs in the ACP bloc that had refused to 
initial or conclude an EPA were re-assigned 
to the EU’s standard GSP scheme. The EU 
declined their requests for admission to the 
GSP+ scheme on the grounds that Gabon did 
not meet the ILO Convention on Minimum Age 
for Admission to Employment criterion, whilst 
Nigeria had not ratified the United Nations 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide and, therefore, 
failed the EU’s human rights criterion. 
A country’s degree of trade dependency on the 
EU (based on a combination of natural resource 
endowments, structure of exports and level of 
economic development – whether an LDC or 
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not) appears to have significantly influenced 
the decision to initial or conclude an EPA. The 
EU remains the most important trading partner 
for many ACP countries:
It is still by far the largest single market 
for Africa’s non-oil exports, absorbing 
51% ($24 billion) of the total in 2006, 
a share that is six times the 8% share 
of Africa’s second largest market (the 
US) for its non-oil exports. (World Bank 
2008, vii.)
An earlier World Bank (2007, 2) study found 
that Cotonou preferences for 13 of the 14 
African non-LDCs amounted to, “3.9 percent 
of their exports to the EU or EUR 782 million 
in 2005”.  If these countries were to revert 
to the EU’s standard GSP, the study estimated 
that the value of their preferences would fall 
to 0.5 percent of their exports or a loss of 670 
million euros: 
The fall would be substantial for all 
countries but particularly high in the 
case of Mauritius, the Seychelles, and 
Swaziland where the value of preferences 
would fall from about 23, 16, and 50 
percent respectively to nearly zero. For 
Kenya, a shift to GSP preferences would 
reduce preferences from 9.7 to 3.9 
percent. (World Bank, 2007, 2.)
The study also found that EPAs (with Cotonou 
rules of origin) could increase the value of 
preferences of these countries to 4.5 percent 
of exports: 
a notional gain of EUR 107 million. If 
EPAs were concluded with simple rules 
of origin, however, preferences could 
be much higher because this could make 
several export products competitive in 
the European market. For example, less 
restrictive rules of origin for apparel 
products in the US under AGOA have led 
to an increase in clothing exports from 
about USD 250 million in 2000 to more 
than USD 800 million in 2004. (World 
Bank, 2007, 2.) 
However, if EPA rules of origin were based on 
the Cotonou preferences, they would provide 
only a marginal increase in preferences (World 
Bank, 2007). 
The rules of origin effectively determine 
the substantive level of preferential market 
access. The rules of origin in all the EPAs are 
subject to further negotiations, but presently 
they embody only modest improvements on 
the Cotonou rules.  The EPA rules of origin 
are similar to the Cotonou rules of origin 
except in textiles, clothing, fisheries and 
certain agricultural products where modest 
improvements have been made (Oxfam 2007; 
Naumann, 2008). 
However, the EPA rules of origin can be seen 
as less favourable than the Cotonou rules in 
two respects. Firstly, EPA rules of origin are 
constrained by the fact that under Cotonou 
rules, ‘cumulation’ applied to all 76 ACP 
countries. With only 40 ACP signatories to 
EPAs (the rest being consigned to the less 
favourable rules of origin of the EU’s EBA 
initiative and standard GSP), the cumulation 
effect has been accordingly diminished 
(Naumann, 2008). 
Secondly, some of the EPA rules of origin, most 
notably the CARIFORUM, are symmetrical. 
That is, they apply to production and trade 
in both directions – trade from CARIFORUM 
states to EU states and vice versa. The 
CARIFORUM argue that asymmetrical rules of 
origin would not have any beneficial effect, 
considering the availability of materials and 
production facilities in the EU. Given their 
unique local and resource endowments, this 
might be the case for the CARIFORUM, but 
it could be detrimental to the development 
efforts of some African countries. It runs 
counter to the argument of two Oxford 
economists that Africa might benefit from 
trade regimes that specifically protect them 
from Asian manufactures through, among 
others, creative rules of origin. It is not clear 
that symmetrical rules of origin between 
Africa and the EU would achieve this objective 
(Collier and Venables, 2007; Collier, 2007).
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The interim EPAs provide for reciprocal 
liberalization of trade in goods between the 
EU and signatory ACP states. All but the fully 
completed CARIFORUM EPA contain rendez-
vous clauses calling for continued negotiations 
towards full EPAs within one and a half years. 
Until full EPAs replace them or ACP countries 
that have initialled them withdraw, they are 
WTO-legal and will govern trade between 
the EU and signatory states (Bartels, 2008). 
Some of them came into force in 2008 whilst 
others are scheduled to enter into force 
between 2009 and 2011. Except for the 
CARIFORUM EPA, many of the first generation 
disagreements remain within the interim EPAs. 
These disagreements have been compounded 
by second- generation disagreements that 
arose during the initialling of the EPAs in 
late 2007. The latter centre on specific 
legal clauses that the EU introduced into the 
interim EPAs which are neither required nor 
provided for by WTO law or the CPA and which 
the ACP countries deem detrimental to their 
development, trade and financial needs: 
MFN clause, standstill clause, non-execution 
clause and dispute settlement mechanisms. 
The rest of this article examines the contested 
issues in detail. Section 2 examines the tariff 
liberalization commitments in the EPA texts to 
determine the interpretation of GATT Article 
XXIV, especially the concepts of substantially 
all trade and reasonable period of time. Section 
3 assesses the legal basis and development 
implications of the MFN clause. Section 4 
examines the legal basis and development 
implications of the standstill clause, whilst 
Section 5 assesses the provisions on dispute 
settlement. Section 6 analyses the non-
execution clause and Section 7 concludes. 
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GATT Article XXIV sets out the requirements 
for Free Trade Agreements and customs unions 
as encompassing the elimination of duties 
and other restrictive commercial regulations 
on substantially all trade within a reasonable 
period of time (GATT, 1994). The exact 
specifications of this Article are notoriously 
ambiguous to the extent that only one FTA (the 
Czech Republic-Slovakia) has been found by 
a GATT/WTO Working Party to satisfy Article 
XXIV although none has been found to be 
incompatible with it (Srinivasan, 2005). 
There is no consensus among scholars and 
policy-makers on what is meant by substantially 
all trade and/or how this is to be determined 
or calculated. Similarly, it is unclear what 
constitutes a reasonable period of time. A 1994 
Understanding on the Interpretation of Article 
XXIV attempted, unsuccessfully, to provide some 
clarity to these terms. The 1994 Understanding 
explained that RPT should exceed 10 years only 
in ‘exceptional cases’, but failed to define what 
constitutes an exceptional case. In respect of 
SAT, the preamble to the Understanding stated 
that the trade expansion to which regional 
agreements contribute:
is increased if the elimination between 
the constituent territories of duties and 
other restrictive regulations of commerce 
extends to all trade, and diminished if any 
major sector is excluded. (GATT, 1994.)
This put some pressure on the practice of 
excluding certain sectors from FTA liberali-
zation commitments, but did not necessarily 
outlaw them.  
Due to the ambiguity of GATT Article XXIV, SAT 
and RPT have been interpreted variously in 
different FTAs. Unsurprisingly, the definition 
of these terms was at the centre of the 
disagreements between the EU and the ACP 
countries in the EPA negotiations.  Prior to EPAs, 
pre-existing FTAs embodied interpretations 
of substantially all trade ranging from 80 to 
90 percent of trade between the parties or 
90 to 95 percent of the combined tariff lines 
of parties, whilst reasonable period of time 
ranged from 10 to 20 years, with countries 
excluding entire sectors, significant portions 
of sectors, range of products or tariff lines 
from their liberalization commitments (Scollay 
and Gynberg, 2005). Examples of variations in 
reasonable period of time include: Thailand-
Australia (20 years), Thailand-New Zealand 
(20), US-Australia (18), Canada-Chile (18), 
Korea-Chile (16), Canada-Costa Rica (15), EU-
Morocco (12), EU-South Africa (12), US-Bahrain 
(10), US-Singapore (10) and US-Morocco (9).
During the first phase of EPA negotiations 
(2002–2007), ACP countries argued for a need 
to reform Article XXIV to accommodate North-
South FTAs by making explicit provisions for 
SDT in favour of developing countries – similar 
to provisions of GATS Article V on economic 
integration agreements between developed 
and developing countries. The EU held that 
such flexibility was already inherent in 
Article XXIV (WTO, 2005). The EU called this 
‘asymmetrical liberalization’: the EU could 
liberalize 100 percent of its trade with given 
ACP groups of countries immediately an EPA 
came into effect whilst the ACP group could 
liberalize up to 90 percent of their trade with 
the EU over a relatively longer period of time – 
initially proposed by the EU as up to 15 years. 
In its initial proposal, the EU interpreted 
substantially all trade to mean 90 percent 
of trade between the parties and reasonable 
period of time as not exceeding 15 years. 
The ACP countries countered that de facto 
flexibility in Article XXIV was neither legally 
secure nor sufficient in scope to assure the SDT 
they required. Among others, they proposed 
an understanding of reasonable period of time 
and exceptional case as constituting anything 
between 18 and 25 years. They also sought to 
introduce development thresholds into the 
substantially all trade requirement (WTO, 
2. WTO COMPATIBILITY: GATT ARTICLE XXIV ON ‘SUBSTANTIALLY 
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2004a). That is, instead of liberalization 
schedules based on pre-determined timeframes 
and product coverage, they would be based on 
objectively verifiable development indicators. 
The EU appeared supportive of elements of 
the ACP countries’ position through its Second 
Submission to the WTO: 
Existing rules fail to create fair and 
equitable treatment between different 
types of RTAs based on their developmental 
impact and promotion of developing 
countries participation in world trade. 
For example, while preferential tariff 
and partial liberalization agreements 
among developing countries fall under 
the Enabling Clause, ambitious and 
full-fledged RTAs, such as Free Trade 
Agreements between developed and 
developing countries are subject to the 
stricter requirements of GATT Article 
XXIV. Yet, North–South RTAs have at 
least as high a development impact as 
any of those falling under the Enabling 
Clause, and it is difficult to see why 
the substantive requirements should be 
radically different. (WTO, 2005, 81.)
However, when it came to the initialling 
of interim EPAs (or the conclusion of the 
CARIFORUM EPA), the EU reverted back to its 
initial interpretation of substantially all trade 
and reasonable period of time. The SADC 
EPA provides for 100 percent liberalization 
by value by the EU as of 1 January 2008 
(with transition periods for rice and sugar) 
and 86 percent liberalization by value by 
Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland. 
Liberalization of 44 sensitive tariff lines is 
envisaged by 2015 and of three further lines 
by 2018. The tariff liberalization commitment 
for Mozambique is 80.5 percent of trade, most 
of which is liberalized at entry into force with 
100 additional tariff lines to be liberalized by 
2018. Some agricultural products are excluded 
from liberalization commitments based on 
either food security or infant industry concerns 
(SADC, 2008).
The East African Community EPA provides for 
100 percent liberalization by value by the EU as 
of 1 January 2008 (with transition periods for 
rice and sugar) and 82 percent liberalization by 
value by the EAC, with 80 percent liberalization 
within 15 years and the remainder in 25 years. 
The liberalization commitments cover 100 
percent of EU tariff lines and 74 percent of 
EAC tariff lines. On the basis of infant industry 
protection, EAC countries have excluded 
some agricultural products, wines and spirits, 
chemicals, plastics, wood- based paper, textiles 
and clothing, footwear and glassware. 
Similarly, the Eastern and Southern Africa 
EPA provides for 100 percent liberalization by 
value by the EU as of 1 January 2008 (with 
transition periods for rice and sugar). Comoros 
and Madagascar will each liberalize 80 percent 
of their imports from the EU, the Comoros will 
liberalize 21.5 percent within five years and 
59.1 percent progressively until 2022, whilst 
Madagascar will liberalize 37 percent within 
five years and 43.7 percent progressively until 
2022. Mauritius will liberalize 95.6 percent of 
its imports from the EU by 2022, whilst the 
Seychelles will liberalize 97.5 percent by 
2022. Zimbabwe is committed to liberalizing 
80 percent by 2022 (EC, 2006). 
Countries in Eastern and Southern Africa have 
excluded several products from liberalization 
commitments out of the need to protect 
sensitive products or industries. For example, 
Mauritius has excluded live animals and meat, 
edible products of animal origin, fats, edible 
preparations and beverages, chemicals, 
plastics and rubber, leather articles and 
fur skins, iron and steel, and consumer 
electronics. The Seychelles has excluded meat, 
fisheries, beverages, tobacco, leather articles 
and vehicles, whilst Zimbabwe has excluded 
cereals, beverages paper, plastics and rubber, 
textiles and clothing, footwear, consumer 
electronics and vehicles. 
The EU-Côte d’Ivoire EPA provides for 100 
percent liberalization by value by the EU as 
of 1 January 2008 (with transition periods 
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for rice and sugar). It allows for 80.8 percent 
liberalization by Côte d’ Ivoire within 15 years. 
It covers 100 percent of EU tariff lines and 
88.7 percent of Côte d’Ivoire’s tariff lines. The 
EU-Ghana EPA, on the other hand, provides 
for 100 percent liberalization by the EU and 
80.48 percent liberalization of EU imports in 
value and 80.01 percent in tariff lines over 15 
years by Ghana. Both Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire 
have excluded certain, mainly agricultural 
products, from liberalization on the grounds 
of food security and infant industry. The 
EU-Cameroon EPA provides for 100 percent 
liberalization by value by the EU as of 1 
January 2008 (with transition periods for rice 
and sugar). Cameroon is committed to at least 
80 percent liberalization in 15 years, but is 
excluding some products, mainly agricultural, 
again on the grounds of food security (Stevens 
et al, 2008, 12–14). 
Finally, the CARIFORUM EPA provides for a 
general moratorium on its tariff liberalization 
commitments on all products for the first three 
years of the EPA.  This moratorium is extended 
for 10 years in the case of revenue-sensitive 
items, such as gasoline, motor vehicles and 
motor vehicle parts. A review clause is provided 
to address the special development needs 
of Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Dominica, 
Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Saint Lucia, Saint 
Christopher and Nevis, and Saint Vincent and 
the Grenadines.
A keen analysis reveals that in all the EPAs, ACP 
countries must liberalize at least 80 percent of 
their trade with the EU within 15 years. Given 
that the EU is liberalizing 100 percent of its 
trade with ACP countries at the onset of specific 
EPAs, this implies that 90 percent of the trade 
between the EU and ACP countries would have 
been liberalized within 15 years.  This suggests 
that the EU is adopting an interpretation of 
GATT Article XXIV, which holds that WTO 
compatibility is met provided that coverage 
of substantially all trade is achieved within 
the 10-year period, regardless of whether the 
transition period extends beyond 10 years for 
some products (WTO 2002b). This is consistent 
with the EU’s initial interpretation of GATT 
Article XXIV as encompassing 90 percent 
of the trade between the parties within a 
period not exceeding 15 years. The five-year 
discrepancy from this definition on the part of 
the ACP countries might be viewed as the EU’s 
understanding of exceptional case in respect 
of North-South FTAs.
Based on prevailing practice, it can be argued 
that for the purposes of compliance with GATT 
Article XXIV, this coverage and period of time 
suffices – 80 percent liberalization by the ACP 
countries within 15 years combined with 100 
percent immediate liberalization by the EU 
or 90 percent liberalization of trade between 
the parties within 15 years. Any commitments 
by ACP countries beyond 80 percent after the 
15-year mark can be viewed as deeper than 
legally necessary. 
This would be consistent with interpretation 
of GATT Article XXIV in other FTAs. It is 
difficult to assess whether one FTA is more 
or less favourable than the other because 
of differences in coverage of goods, 
services and ‘Singapore issues’, excluded 
sectors, products and transition periods. 
Nonetheless, 80 percent liberalization of 
the ACP countries’ trade within 15 years is 
no more or less favourable than the implicit 
definition of substantially all trade and 
reasonable period of time embodied in the 
following FTAs: Thailand-Australia (20 years), 
Thailand-New Zealand (20), US-Australia 
(18), Canada-Chile (18), Korea-Chile (16), 
Canada-Costa Rica (15), EU-Morocco (12), 
EU-South Africa (12), US-Bahrain (10),US-
Singapore (10) and US-Morocco (9). The US-
Morocco FTA may have one of the shortest 
reasonable periods of time in North-South 
FTAs, but it also excludes a significant 
number of products from liberalization 
commitments. In general, exclusions play a 
significant role in determining the depth of 
liberalization commitments and are relatively 
more expansive in other FTAs compared to 
the EPAs:  
With the exception of US bilateral 
relations with Mexico and Chile, all 
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other US bilateral FTAs fall short of 
full liberalization for both parties. 
Products that were excluded, or phased-
out over more than 20 years in one or 
more agreements include sugar, some 
dairy items, beef, wheat, poultry, 
eggs, margarine, ethanol, potatoes and 
onions. In addition, US bilateral FTAs 
establish quantity or price-based special 
safeguards for certain agricultural 
products. In a few cases, parties 
have agreed to extend, or review the 
possibility of extending, the application 
of the special agricultural safeguards 
beyond the transition period (Hufbauer 
and Baldwin, 2005, 21.)
Whilst USA-based FTAs generally tend to 
eliminate barriers on substantially all the 
merchandise trade of the partners, they 
invariably tend to either nearly exclude 
agriculture entirely (e.g. the USA-Canada 
FTA, later to become the North American 
Free Trade Agreement or NAFTA) or to include 
extended phase-outs for sensitive agricultural 
products (e.g. the USA-Australia FTA), which 
undermines their substantially all trade 
credentials. The EU prefers to exclude specific 
products rather than sectors.  For example, 
the list of excluded products in the Trade 
Development and Co-operation Agreement was 
long and included sugar products and other 
confectionery, biscuits, dairy products, breads 
and prepared foods. 
In some of its FTAs, such as the TDCA, EU-
Chile, EU-Czech Republic, EU-Lithuania and 
EU-Morocco, the EU has committed only to 
tariff reductions rather elimination or made 
no commitments at all in respect of certain 
products, notably fish, cheese and some wines. 
These undermine the substantially all trade 
credentials of some of the EU-based FTAs. 
Considering that EPAs have relatively few of 
these exclusions, 90 percent liberalization 
of trade between the parties within 15 years 
would constitute an equivalent if not deeper 
liberalization commitment than many FTAs 
when based on prevailing practice. 
An analysis by Robert Scollay and Roman 
Grynberg (2005, 3) of 15 FTAs (North-South 
and North-North) found that under different 
interpretations of substantially all trade and 
reasonable period of time, the compatibility 
of many FTAs with GATT Article XXIV varies:
If the SAT requirement must be met within 
the first ten years of the implementation 
period, and if SAT is defined as inclusion 
of 95% of the combined tariff lines of both 
partners, then the Singapore-Japan, EU-
South Africa and Canada-Costa Rica FTAs 
fail to meet this definition. If the 95% 
definition is applied to each member on 
an individual basis, then non-compliance 
in each of these agreements is limited 
to Japan, South Africa and Costa Rica 
respectively. If the definition is relaxed 
to 90% of the combined tariff lines of 
both partners, then only the EU-South 
Africa FTA fails to meet this definition. 
If the 90% definition is applied to each 
member on an individual basis, then 
South Africa in the EU-South Africa FTA 
and Costa Rica in the Canada-Costa Rica 
FTA still remain short of compliance with 
this definition. If no time limit is imposed 
for meeting the SAT requirement, only 
the Singapore-Japan FTA on a combined 
basis, and within that FTA Japan on an 
individual basis, fail to meet SAT defined 
as 95% of tariff lines. A definition based on 
90% of tariff lines would however be met 
on both bases even in this agreement. 
Thus none of the agreements analysed 
would fail to comply with SAT defined as 
90% of tariff lines.
The compatibility of all the EPAs will vary 
more or less as the above FTAs under the 
same criteria (none of them would fail to 
comply with SAT defined as either 90 percent 
of tariff lines or 90 percent of trade between 
the parties). Compared to many FTAs, the EPAs 
appear to commit ACP countries to relatively 
deeper liberalization commitments, the longer 
transition periods notwithstanding. This might 
impact on their development, financial and 
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trade needs by constraining their policy space 
in dealing with fluctuations in world markets 
and tax revenues, and in protecting their 
infant industries, among others. 
More importantly, what the ACP countries 
gain through asymmetrical liberalization, 
they appear to lose through the standstill 
and MFN clauses (see sections 3 and 4 for the 
discussion). There is no need to make much of 
this asymmetrical liberalization. For many ACP 
countries, the EU’s immediate and complete 
liberalization of its markets makes little or no 
difference. All members of the EBA initiative 
in the ACP group (33 of the ACP LDCs, eight 
of which have initialled the EPAs in Africa) 
already enjoyed duty free and quota free 
access to the EU. The remaining ACP countries 
either already enjoyed GSPs in many relevant 
EU products or faced significant supply-side 
constraints and will be hard pressed to take 
any advantage of further opening of the EU 
market (Brenton and Manchin, 2003; Grossman 
and Sykes, 2005; UNCTAD, 2003). The cost to 
the EU of 100 percent liberalization is at best 
minimal, at worst negligible.
Given their levels of economic development, 
an argument can be made for greater use of 
‘exclusions’ by ACP countries than is presently 
the case.  For example, in recognition of the 
economic asymmetry between the parties, 
the European Free Trade Association-Chile 
FTA allows indefinite phase out periods for 
a wide range of products including organic 
chemicals, fertilizers, tanning products, cos-
metics, plastics and rubbers, raw fur skins, 
bricks and other ceramic products, glassware, 
some articles of iron and base metals, some 
electrical and mechanical appliances, vehicles 
and vehicle parts, etc. in favour of Chile 
(Hufbauer and Baldwin, 2005, 21).  Similarly, 
US bilateral FTAs, with the exception of Chile 
and Mexico, do not provide full elimination of 
agricultural barriers. Under the US-Canada FTA, 
certain agricultural products remain indefinitely 
subject to reduced tariff rates. Likewise, in 
the USA-Israel FTA, reduced tariffs remain on 
about 220 lines for dairy products and peanuts 
(Hufbauer and Baldwin, 2005, 2).
There are no indefinite phase-outs in the 
EPAs although all EPA initialling ACP countries 
make some exclusions. However, as already 
mentioned, these are product- rather than 
sector-based and appear to have been premised 
on static rather than dynamic considerations, 
with the possible exception of Mauritius. 
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Free Trade Agreements are, by definition, 
legal exceptions to GATT Article 1 on most 
favoured nation treatment. GATT Article 
1 provides that WTO Members must grant 
immediate and unconditional MFN treatment 
to the products of other members with 
respect to customs duties and import 
charges, internal taxes and regulations, and 
other trade-related matters (GATT, 1994). 
Members can only derogate from Article 1 in 
two exceptional cases: under GATT Article 
XXIV to form FTAs and customs unions (in 
which at least one partner is a developed 
country) and the Enabling Clause in respect 
of GSP schemes for developing countries or 
South-South FTAs. 
Whilst not a requirement of the WTO, the use 
of the MFN clause in FTAs is not uncommon. 
Of the 20 Regional Trade Agreements reviewed 
by the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) in 2008, only five did 
not have an MFN clause. Notable North-South 
FTAs with the MFN clause include the North 
American Free Trade Agreement, the Central 
American-Dominican Republic Free Trade 
Agreement, Japan-Mexico, Thailand-Australia 
and USA-Morocco. 
However, Economic Partnership Agreements 
represent the first time that the EU is including 
the MFN clause in its FTAs, at least with the 
developing world (FTAs between the EU-Chile, 
EU-Mexico and EU-South Africa contain no such 
clause). The inclusion of the MFN clause in 
the EPAs is both legally and developmentally 
problematic. Legally, it is WTO-plus – it is 
neither necessary under GATT Article XXIV 
on which the EPAs are predicated nor under 
GATS Article V in the case of agreement on 
services because GATS Article V, unlike GATT 
Article XXIV, explicitly provides for special and 
differential treatment for developing countries 
which would cover any non-discriminatory 
obligations of GATS Article II (on MFN treatment 
in the GATS). 
The MFN provision does not appear in the 
entirety of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement. 
Nonetheless, the MFN clause is included in all 
the EPAs texts (Articles 19, 70 and 79 in the 
CARIFORUM EPA, Article 28 in the SADC EPA, 
Article 15 in the EAC EPA, and Article 16 in the 
ESA region EPA). It is identical in all the texts 
with a slight twist in the CARIFORUM EPA. In all 
the EPAs, the MFN clause stipulates that any 
more favourable tariff preferences granted 
to any “major trading economies” (defined 
as economies accounting for a share of world 
merchandise exports above 1 percent) shall 
automatically be granted to any party of the 
EPA. In the CARIFORUM EPA, the MFN clause 
transfer is not automatic, but subject to joint 
agreement between the parties (CARIFORUM, 
2008). The EPA MFN clause also provides that 
the EU shall automatically transfer any more 
favourable treatment it might offer any third 
party partners in future FTAs to ACP countries 
regardless of the share of world trade of the 
third party partners.  
There is a fundamental difference between the 
function of the MFN clause in the multilateral 
system and in regional trade. In the former, 
the clause prevents trade discrimination in 
the global trading system (i.e. compels equal 
treatment among trading partners except 
where permitted through derogation). In the 
latter, the clause protects commercial or 
mercantilist interests of individual parties to 
given FTAs, but falls short of Pareto superiority 
(globally welfare enhancing) and even its 
defenders only make the case for it on ”second 
best” grounds: 
The multilateral MFN ensures that all 
parties to the global trade agreement 
are given non discriminatory treatment…  
the MFN Clause in an RTA has a value for 
investors not only as a standard to prevent 
any discriminatory vis a vis other investors 
but also if it can create a liberalization 
dynamic. (OECD, 2008, 290.)
3. THE MOST FAVOURED NATION CLAUSE
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As argued elsewhere in this article, the case 
for trade liberalization as inherently beneficial 
is contested (see, for example, Chang 2002). 
The EU justifies the inclusion of the MFN clause 
in the EPAs with two additional arguments, one 
predicated on its interests, the other allegedly 
on the interests of ACP countries. Regarding 
the former, the EU argues that the MFN clause 
protects it against potentially less favourable 
treatment by ACP countries in future FTAs with 
third country partners. “It is difficult to say that 
Europe should let our partner countries treat 
our economic adversaries better than us. We 
are generous but not naïve” (EU Development 
Commissioner, Louis Michel, quoted in Stevens 
2008, 58). In respect of the latter, the EU 
argues that the EPA MFN clause protects 
the ACP countries from aggressive market 
demands from developed and economically 
advanced developing countries such as BRICs 
(Brazil, Russia, India and China). That is, the 
knowledge that any more favourable treatment 
that they may exert from the ACP countries 
will automatically be accorded to the EU might 
prevent economically advanced countries 
from taking advantage of the ACP countries’ 
relatively weak bargaining position.
There are a number of problems with these 
arguments. While persuasive, the mercantilist 
argument has the distinct drawback that the 
EU’s mercantilist’s interests are unlikely to 
align or be consistent with the ACP countries’ 
development, financial or trade interests. The 
ACP countries’ argument for protection is less 
persuasive and problematic at several levels. 
For one, if they viewed the EPA MFN clause 
as protecting them against aggressive market 
interests of third parties, they would not be as 
strongly opposed to it as they are. Secondly, 
if they need protection from more developed 
countries, such as BRICS, and if the MFN clause 
is to protect them from such countries, who 
or what is to protect them from the EU’s own 
mercantilist interests or is the EU devoid of 
such interests? 
Thirdly and more importantly, the Enabling 
Clause governs South-South FTAs but, by 
including some developing countries in its 
definition of major trading economies the 
EPA MFN clause poses a serious challenge to 
the purposes and functions of the Enabling 
Clause and the smooth functioning of the 
multilateral WTO system. For example, 2006 
figures show that the EPA MFN definition of 
major trading economies included a number of 
developing countries including Brazil, China, 
India, Indonesia, Malaysia and Mexico. This 
explains why even before the interim EPAs had 
been signed, Brazil with the support of several 
other developing countries, protested the 
inclusion of the MFN clause in the EPAs (ICTSD, 
2008). The protests by third party developing 
countries are significant because it was a third 
party developing country challenge to the Lomé 
Preferences that led, at least in part, to their 
collapse and to the establishment of the EPAs 
under GATT Article XXIV rather than under the 
Enabling Clause. The European Union’s share 
of world merchandize exports was 10 percent 
in 2006. If it were looking for countries with 
a similar export level, a figure close to this 
would be reasonable and would still include 
China, but would exclude Indonesia, Malaysia 
and Mexico, for example.
Most favoured nation clauses in FTAs come in 
various forms. In many FTAs, the MFN clause 
applies to chapters on investment and services 
only (in part because of the requirements 
of GATS Article 11 although in others it also 
applies to trade in goods or trade in goods, 
services and investment (Bossche, 2004; OECD, 
2008; Stoler, 2007). Many MFN provisions that 
have been inspired by GATS Article II cover both 
pre- and post-RTA establishment (e.g. Australia-
New Zealand, Chile-Korea, Japan-Australia, 
Thailand-Australia FTA. Some are broad in 
scope and seek to compel non-discrimination 
by covering the entirety of the FTA, such as the 
EFTA-Singapore MFN clause, which provides for 
each party to receive the same benefits that 
its counterpart affords any future FTA partners. 
The USA-Morocco MFN clause is limited to 
market access and provides that, in the event 
that Morocco grants any other trading partner in 
its future FTAs better market access than that 
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granted to the US, Morocco is under obligation 
to grant the same treatment to the USA under 
the USA-Morocco FTA. 
The EPA MFN clause does not cover the entirety 
of the agreements. It is limited to trade in 
goods except in the CARIFORUM MFN clause, 
which encompasses services and investment. 
Overall, the EPA MFN clause constrains the 
trade policy options of ACP countries by locking 
them into giving the EU any more favourable 
treatment that they might give to third party 
major trading partners, which might include 
relatively advanced developing countries. This 
is potentially significant as many ACP countries, 
especially in Africa are increasingly expanding 
their trade and investment relationships with 
countries such as China and India. 
Considerable literature questions the economic 
value of the FTA MFN clause where national 
treatment is provided (as is the case with EPAs). 
The United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) (2004) and OECD (2008) 
have both argued, for example, that the only 
case where the FTA MFN clause might be more 
advantageous than national treatment is where 
foreign incentives are granted to foreign but 
not domestic investors. In cases where foreign 
investors are favoured over domestic companies, 
the MFN clause can be more favourable than 
national treatment for it will ensure that an FTA 
partner of the country extending incentives to 
third party foreign investors extends the same 
to its FTA partner. 
The EPA MFN clause might enhance ACP 
countries’ dependency on trade with the EU 
by increasing the transaction costs of trade 
negotiations with third party partners. It is 
not clear that this is a good thing. Free Trade 
Agreements between ACP countries and 
other industrialized countries might serve to 
diminish any ‘trade diversion’ effects that 
the EPAs might entail. Trade diversionary 
effects of North-South FTAs should not be 
under-estimated. A recently unclassified 
United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) Foreign Agricultural Service study 
found that following the establishment of 
the EU-Morocco FTA, USA exports to Morocco 
fell by 52 percent from 1999 to 2001, but 
grew by 13 percent between 2003 and 2004 
following the establishment of the USA-
Morocco FTA, which gave the USA essentially 
the same preferences as those given to the 
EU (USDA, 2005).
Developed countries are increasingly inter-
ested in FTAs with developing countries. For 
example, the Central American Free Trade 
Agreement-Dominican Republic (CAFTA-DR) 
includes the USA and the Dominican Republic, 
an ACP member with an EPA. The USA has 
similarly been exploring opportunities of 
an FTA with the Southern African Customs 
Union since at least 2003. As a result of the 
inclusion of the EPA MFN clause, third party 
developed countries now have to weigh the 
cost implications of entering into FTAs with 
ACP countries with EPAs and they are also more 
likely to demand such MFN clauses themselves. 
Considering the limited provisions for SDT 
in the EPAs this might not portend well for 
ACP countries’ development, financial and 
trade needs. 
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The standstill clause binds ACP countries’ 
tariffs at applied rather than bound tariffs 
at the time of entry into force of the interim 
EPAs (see for example, Article 23 of the 
SADC EAC EPA and Article 13 of the EAC EPA). 
There are significant variations between 
the EPAs regarding the standstill clause. In 
CARIFORUM, SADC and the PACP regions’ 
EPAs, standstill applies only to products 
committed for liberalization (CARIFORUM, 
2008; SADC, 2008).  The tariffs are bound at 
applied rates immediately the interim EPAs 
come into force whether or not the product 
is scheduled for immediate liberalization or 
15 years later.  In the EAC and ESA EPAs, the 
standstill clause applies to all trade between 
the parties. No distinction is made between 
goods committed for liberalization and 
excluded goods (EC, 2006; EAC, 2008). 
Both forms of standstill are neither legally 
(WTO) necessary nor desirable from 
the development, financial and trade 
perspectives of ACP countries. Legally, the 
WTO only requires tariffication (converting 
all import restrictions that did not take the 
form of tariffs, e.g. quotas into tariffs and 
binding them at bound rates) from developing 
countries. Least developed countries, the 
majority of which are part of the ACP group, 
have no obligations under the WTO to make 
commitments to reduce tariffs or subsidies 
(Bilal and Lui, 2009, 3; Oxfam 2007).  
In terms of the development, financial and 
trade needs of ACP countries, it makes little 
sense to freeze the tariffs at applied rather 
than bound rates or to apply the applied 
rates immediately EPAs come into effect. This 
point was powerfully brought home by the 
food crisis that was unraveling at the time 
the interim EPAs were being initialled. As a 
result of increasingly high world food prices 
and growing famine in many parts of Africa in 
2007 and 2008, many countries had reduced 
their import duties on food items to zero 
(applied rates) although they were still bound 
at very high levels. Freezing these rates at 
this level would essentially displace local food 
production in Africa, confining the continent 
to even more vulnerability to food insecurity. 
It is less surprising that, in October 2008, the 
EU was forced to allow an increase of duties 
on cereal imports within the SADC region as 
local food production improved.
Freezing ACP countries’ tariffs at applied 
rather than bound tariffs undermines 
the ability of ACP countries to adjust to 
changing economic circumstances, especially 
fluctuations in world markets. Subjecting all 
trade between the parties to the standstill 
clause essentially erases any benefits 
that might arise from the much vaunted 
“asymmetrical liberalization” as discussed 
in Section 2. The African, Caribbean and 
Pacific countries’ bound rates may be high 
but that does not make them insignificant. 
The process of tariffication was not costless 
for many developing countries and the WTO 
gave them until 2005 to carry it out. Having 
only recently completed the exercise, there 
is no compelling economic reason for them 
to ignore their bound tariffs and freeze 
everything at applied levels.
The EU argues that the chief benefit of the 
standstill clause is trade liberalization. 
For the EU, anything that achieves trade 
liberalization is beneficial in and of itself. 
This proposition, although shared by the 
World Bank (2007), among others, has been 
refuted numerous times. Firstly, there is 
little evidence that trade liberalization in 
and of itself promotes economic development 
(Rodrik, 2001; Singh, 2003; United Nations 
Economic Commission for Africa, 2004).  In 
any case, individual ACP countries should 
make this determination. For example, both 
Mauritius and the Seychelles committed to 
liberalize over 95 percent of their trade 
with the EU in their interim EPAs based on 
their development, financial and trade 
needs. It is fair to assume that ACP countries 
seeking lower thresholds are making similar 
determination in good faith. Their opposition 
4. THE ‘STANDSTILL’ CLAUSE
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to the standstill clause should be understood 
in this context as it is inextricably linked to 
tariff liberalization commitments. 
Some of the EPAs (e.g. the CARIFORUM EPA) 
not only cover services but also provide for 
a standstill clause in services whilst others 
provide for future negotiations on services 
(e.g. SADC).  The standstill clause in services in 
the CARIFORUM EPA prohibits any EPA signatory 
country from introducing any new policies 
inconsistent with GATS Articles XVI and XVII 
that would restrict service suppliers of other 
parties in terms of access to their markets, or 
that would discriminate in favour of national 
services suppliers over foreign services 
suppliers. This provision constrains the ACP 
countries’ policy space in the development of 
their national services sectors. 
Trade in services falls under GATS and any 
services agreement within EPAs would have 
to comply with GATS Article V (counterpart 
to GATT Article XXIV). As with GATT Article 
XXIV, GATS Article V does not provide for the 
standstill clause and its inclusion in the EPAs 
is not legally necessary. More importantly, 
unlike GATT Article XXIV, GATS Article V (3a) 
explicitly provides for special and differential 
treatment in favour of developing country 
parties to an FTA.
The EU has demonstrated more flexibility 
or sensitivity to ACP countries’ arguments 
on the standstill clause than on any other 
contested issue discussed here. Following 
an outcry from several African countries, a 
number of modifications have been made 
to the EPA standstill clause. For example, 
CEMAC (Cameroon) has a provision to halt 
tariff reduction unilaterally for a maximum 
period of one year. The SADC standstill 
clause does not apply to goods excluded 
from liberalization commitments and all the 
African EPAs except the ESA region allow 
for the temporary introduction/increase of 
export duties in exceptional circumstances 
(Stevens et al, 2008). 
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The dispute settlement mechanisms included 
in all interim EPAs and the CARIFORUM EPA 
(e.g. Articles 54, 55 ESA EPA; Articles 38, 
39, EAC EPA, Part 111 SADC EPA, Title V, 
Ghana EPA) are very similar. Mostly, they 
are relatively restrictive modifications of 
WTO dispute settlement and reflect the EU’s 
vision of reform. The EPA dispute settlement 
mechanisms are detailed and judicially rather 
than politically or diplomatically inclined (Karli, 
2008).  Accordingly, they reinforce or do little 
to diminish the ‘upstream’ and ‘downstream’ 
constraints to developing countries’ utilization 
of the WTO DS (Alavi, 2007; Karli, 2008; 
Hoekman and Mavroidis, 2000).  
Robert Hudec (1993, 353) has summarised the 
experience of developing countries with the 
multilateral dispute settlement mechanism in 
the history of GATT/WTO: 
The quantitative analysis of individual 
country performance makes it pretty 
clear that the GATT dispute settlement 
system is, at the margin, more 
responsive to the interests of the strong 
than to the interests of the weak. The 
evidence for this hypothesis occurs in 
all phases of performance – in the rates 
of success as complainants, in the rates 
of noncompliance as defendants, in the 
quality of the outcomes achieved, and 
in the extent to which complainants 
are able to carry complaints forward 
to a decision. Perhaps the most 
important finding in this regard is the 
very substantial difference in the rates 
of withdrawal before a ruling is made, 
suggesting that the weaker countries 
encounter significantly greater barriers 
at the outset of the process.
Busch and Reinhardt (2000) concur with 
Hudec and find that WTO reforms, by adding 
several thousand pages of new treaty text, 
several new stages of legal activity per 
dispute (e.g. appeals, compliance reviews and 
compensation arbitration), a growing body of 
case law and permissible delays in complying 
with adverse rulings, have compounded the 
hurdles facing developing countries in WTO 
DS. Broadly, these hurdles can be divided into 
two: (a) many developing countries lack the 
human and financial resources to effectively 
participate in the increasingly judicial and 
lengthy system; and (b) because of the 
nature of their economies and their economic 
dependency on developed countries, many 
developing countries (especially the smaller 
ones) are unlikely to benefit from the remedial 
measures of WTO DS.
The WTO DS system (Article 19) provides for the 
cessation of a violation as a remedy, i.e. the 
violating country taking measures to comply 
with its WTO obligations. It also provides for 
‘suggestions’ or ‘recommendations’ on ways 
in which offending Members can comply and 
for consequences in the event of failures 
to comply within specified periods of time. 
Such consequences include compensation 
and suspension of concessions or other 
obligations. Compensation entails the losing 
party providing the winning party with 
new market access or a mutually agreed 
alternative, i.e. monetary payments. Within 
the WTO DS, suspension of concessions is 
automatic and does not require the consent 
of the losing party. It usually entails the 
imposition of tariffs by the winning party 
on relevant products or sectors of the losing 
party (Alavi, 2007; Karli, 2008). 
Retaliatory trade measures (e.g. suspension 
of concessions and other obligations) have 
long been considered an unviable option 
for developing countries wronged by large 
industrial countries. For example, if Mauritius 
were to suspend concessions and obligations 
to the EU as a result of the EU’s breach of 
some trade obligation, it is Mauritius that 
would suffer greater economic damage from 
such suspension. This renders suspension 
of concessions an ineffective remedy for 
many developing countries, as recently 
demonstrated by the Antigua and Barbuda 
– USA Gambling case. Despite losing the 
case, the USA has been slow to implement 
5. THE EPA DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISMS
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the decision within a reasonable period of 
time but the economic costs to Antigua and 
Barbuda of suspending concessions to the US 
are prohibitive:
The ‘mere passage of rules and 
procedures, whether bilateral or 
multilateral, does not in some magical 
way mute the exercise of power… to win 
a case in law is not necessarily to win 
in terms of one’s economic interests.  
What matters to the preservation or 
extension of an individual’s economic 
interests ultimately rests on that indivi-
dual’s bargaining power. Rules and the 
enforcement of rules ultimately remain 
matters that are bargained for amongst 
states. (Drahos, 2005, 14.)  
It is as a result of these constraints that there 
have been calls and proposals for special and 
differential treatment in favour of developing 
countries within the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Understanding (DSU). Within the WTO DSU, SDT 
is mostly procedural (i.e. developing countries 
may choose a faster procedure, request 
longer timeframes, or legal aid from the WTO 
Secretariat) and is provided for at different 
stages of the WTO DS process. Article 4.10 of 
the DSU provides for SDT in the consultations 
phase of the dispute settlement and requests 
Members to give special attention to the 
problems and interests of developing countries. 
For example, if the object of the consultations 
is a measure taken by a developing country 
Member, the parties may agree to extend the 
regular periods of consultation. If, at the end 
of the consultation period, the parties cannot 
agree that the consultations have concluded, 
Article 12.10 of the DSU grants the Dispute 
Settlement Body chairperson the power to 
extend the time period for consultations.
Article 8.10 of the DSU provides for SDT at 
the panel stage by allowing a developing 
country Member in a dispute with a developed 
country Member to request the inclusion of at 
least one panelist from a developing country 
Member. The article also provides for the panel 
to accord a developing country Member more 
time to prepare and present its defence if a 
developing country Member is the respondent. 
However, Article 12.10 of the DSU moderates 
this provision by stipulating that this must not 
affect the overall time period for the panel to 
complete the dispute settlement procedure.  
Articles 21.2, 21.3 (c), 21.7 and 21.8 provide 
for SDT at the implementation phase.  Among 
others, they provide that:
• particular attention be paid to matters 
affecting the interests of developing 
country Members in the determination 
of the reasonable period of time for 
implementation; 
• the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) must 
consider, at the request of a developing 
country Member, what further and 
appropriate action it might take in addition 
to surveillance and status reports;
• in such consideration, the DSB must take 
into account not only the trade coverage 
of the challenged measures, but also their 
impact on the economy of developing 
country Members concerned.
In addition to SDT provisions at these different 
stages of the WTO DS process, the multilateral 
GATT/WTO dispute settlement system also 
provides for SDT through the accelerated 
procedures of the Decision of 5 April 1966: 
This Decision provides, first, that the 
Director-General may use his good 
offices, and conduct consultations at the 
request of the developing country with 
a view to facilitating a solution to the 
dispute, where the consultations between 
the parties have failed. Second, if these 
consultations conducted by the Director-
General do not bring about a mutually 
satisfactory solution within two months, 
the Director-General submits, at the 
request of one of the parties, a report on 
his action. The DSB then establishes the 
panel with the approval of the parties. 
Third, the panel must take due account 
of all circumstances and considerations 
relating to the application of the 
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challenged measures, and their impact 
on the trade and economic development 
of the affected Members. Fourth, the 
Decision provides for only 60 days for 
the panel to submit its findings from 
the date the matter was referred to it. 
Where the Panel considers this time-
frame insufficient it may extend it with 
the agreement of the complaining party. 
(WTO, 2004b, 112–113.)
Article 27.2 of the DSU provides for the WTO 
Secretariat to make available to any developing 
country Member on request, a qualified legal 
expert from the WTO Technical Cooperation 
Services. Additionally, private legal counsel 
may appear before panels and the Appellate 
Body as part of a party’s delegation. An 
intergovernmental organization known as 
the Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL) was 
created in 2001 to provide advice and training 
on WTO law to developing countries and 
countries with economies in transition. It is 
independent of the WTO.
In spite of these provisions, the effectiveness 
of SDT in the WTO DSU remains questionable 
(see for example Mitchell, 2006; WTO 2004b). 
The reasons for this are varied and complex but 
can be summed up as follows. The constraints 
facing many developing countries at the WTO 
DSU cannot be addressed through the granting 
of procedural privileges. The application of 
such procedural privileges might detract from 
the legitimacy of the results of proceedings. 
Many developing countries have been 
reluctant to invoke such procedures for this 
reason. Whilst in the negotiations, developing 
countries have tended to seek procedural 
privileges; in dispute settlement practice 
they have tended to seek formal equality with 
developed countries. 
The EPA DS provisions largely mirror those 
of the WTO DSU but are relatively more 
restrictive. By far, the most severe limitation 
of the EPA DS is its lack of special and 
differential treatment, given its development 
orientation and its nature as a North-South 
FTA. Whilst the WTO DSU provides a modicum 
of SDT through mostly procedural privileges, 
the interim EPAs and the CARIFORUM EPA make 
no explicit provisions for SDT.  Similarly, EPA 
DS makes no provision for related legal or any 
form of technical assistance. 
More substantively, it can be argued that 
the EPA DS provisions are more restrictive 
than the WTO DS system in respect of their 
lack of flexibility in time limits for dispute 
resolution – in favour of ACP countries. Whilst 
the statutory maximum timeframe for a WTO 
dispute resolution is 20 months (including 
consultations, panel and Appellate Board 
rulings), the maximum statutory timeframe for 
dispute settlement under all the EPAs is just 
under 12 months (see for example, CARIFORUM 
2008; Karli, 2008).  The EPA DS reduces the 
panel stage to six months (instead of seven to 
eight months under the WTO), which shortens 
the period for filing legal submissions. This is 
a crucial stage for developing countries given 
their limited access to legal resources (Karli, 
2008, 29). The restriction of this space in EPA 
DS makes it more restrictive than WTO DS. 
The relatively shorter Panel stage in EPA DS 
would seem to favour the EU, which disposes 
of sufficient legal capacity. However, the 
point here is not that this shorter timeframe 
is problematic per se but rather, considering 
the human and financial challenges ACP 
countries face, some flexibility in their favour 
in respect of this timeframe would be helpful 
to them without hurting the EU. 
Although EPA DS shortens and is very specific 
about the ruling processes of dispute 
settlement (e.g. panel decisions), it is 
curiously silent on the RPT within which 
arbitral decisions must be implemented (see 
for example CARIFORUM, 2008; SADC, 2008). 
The WTO DS is specific on RPT, setting it 
at 15 months.  In contradistinction, EPA DS 
provides for panels to take into consideration 
the length of time it would normally take the 
defending party to adopt the legislative or 
administrative measures to bring itself into 
compliance. The panels are also advised to 
take into consideration demonstrable capacity 
constraints, which may affect the defending 
party’s adoption of the measures necessary for 
compliance. Whilst this might be construed 
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as SDT in favour of ACP countries, there is 
nothing in EPA DS that prevents the EU from 
also invoking it (i.e. it is symmetrical). 
Any symmetry in the implementation of 
arbitral decisions favours the EU, given the 
economic asymmetries between the EU 
and ACP countries. Special and differential 
treatment in respect of the reasonable 
period of time that the losing party would 
be allowed to implement the arbitral award 
is implicit but not precise in the EPA texts. 
As Karli (2008) has argued, even this minimal 
and implicit SDT provision is problematic 
because it only regulates the situation where 
an ACP country is a defendant, but is silent 
on circumstances where the EU is the losing 
party. This is significant for ACP countries 
because considering the dependence of their 
economies on trade with the EU, a delay in 
implementation of arbitral decisions may 
adversely affect their economies.  
The relative restrictiveness of EPA DS 
timeframes is also partly caused by the lack 
of provision for Appellate Review in the EPAs, 
which means the timeframes are shorter than 
in WTO DS. This in itself is a major weakness 
of EPA DS. Considering the asymmetrical 
distribution of power between the EU and 
the ACP group, an Appellate Review would 
provide internal checks and balances against 
judicial excesses, biases or mistakes. The 
case for that has been amply demonstrated by 
the sometimes conflicting decisions between 
WTO Panel and Appellate Rulings.  
EPA DS is also more restrictive than the WTO 
DS in respect of provisions on membership 
of dispute settlement bodies. Article 8.1 of 
the WTO DSU explicitly allows government 
officials to serve on WTO Panels although 
members of government or citizens of 
parties to a dispute, including third parties 
are excluded. In contradistinction, EPA DS 
prohibits government officials from being 
nominated as panelists. This is not a problem 
per se, as the impartiality of government 
officials is a legitimate concern. The problem 
arises in the lack of clarification regarding 
this criterion. For example, it is not clear 
whether this applies to anyone who has ever 
served in government regardless of whether 
they are members of the government at the 
time of the dispute settlement. The EPAs 
provide for a permanent list of arbitrators 
to be provided at the time of the entry into 
force of the agreements (EAC, 2008; SADC, 
2008; CARIFORUM, 2008). It is not clear when 
and how the non-governmental-affiliation 
condition is satisfied. 
With the exception of the SADC EPA, all 
EPA DS provisions provide for the parties to 
select five individuals each and to agree on 
five other persons who are not nationals of 
any of the parties. The SADC EPA provides for 
eight members each and five non-nationals 
(EC, 2006; EAC, 2008; CARIFORUM, 2008; 
SADC, 2008). Any measure that restricts 
ACP countries’ choice of panelists limits 
the impartiality of the EPA DS. If countries 
cannot choose the panelists they want, they 
are unlikely to have confidence in the arbitral 
decisions. Given the limited technical capacity 
within ACP countries, the lack of clarity on 
the governmental membership criterion is 
likely to limit the technical pool from which 
ACP countries can nominate panelists. 
In a departure from the WTO DS system, all the 
EPAs provide for compensation as a first-choice 
retaliatory measure. Whilst this has been 
lauded in some quarters, such compensation 
is conditional upon the mutual agreement 
of the parties.  This falls short of the WTO’s 
suspension of concessions, which is not subject 
to the agreement of the parties. While the 
WTO DS system does not contain any provision 
describing the form compensation may take, 
all the EPAs, except Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire, 
contain potentially important clauses. For 
instance, the PACP regions, SADC and Cameroon 
EPAs explicitly provide that compensation may 
include or consist of financial compensation 
although all qualify that this does not oblige 
the defendant to offer financial compensation. 
Furthermore, the SADC EPA stipulates that if 
SADC were the complainant, and asserted that 
other retaliatory measures would significantly 
damage its economy, the EU should consider 
providing financial compensation (SADC, 2008). 
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This might be read as an assertion of special 
and differential treatment by SADC. 
In a further potentially flexible departure 
from the WTO DS system, the EPA DS provisions 
provide for ‘appropriate measures’ instead 
of suspension of concessions. Whilst this 
terminology provides a wider variety of 
retaliatory measures than those embodied 
in the WTO’s suspension of concessions, it is 
symmetrical. This means that the EU reserves 
the right to use it too.  This symmetry renders 
it vulnerable to manipulation and diminishes 
its economic advantage to ACP countries. For 
example, some ACP countries are suspicious 
that the EU might employ this clause in respect 
of development assistance (aid), which is 
critical to ACP countries but is not a trade issue 
(i.e. not a legally binding commitment under 
EPA). In order to prevent such an opportunistic 
interpretation, the Ghana EPA explicitly 
proscribes development assistance from the 
definition of appropriate measures. 
Most EPAs contain further provisions that 
discipline the use of appropriate measures both 
for the EU and ACP countries. In that regard, 
all the EPAs require retaliating parties to 
consider the economic impact of their actions 
on the losing party, with the PACP countries’ 
EPA going so far as to stipulate consideration of 
the impact on development and the economy 
(PACP, 2008):
Considering how difficult, if not impos-
sible, it is for most ACP countries to 
suspend any concessions vis-à-vis the EU, 
let alone harming the EU, the additional 
flexibility provided by the use of the 
term ‘appropriate measures’ may be 
welcome. This flexibility would give to 
the ACP countries the chance to enjoy a 
richer tool box of retaliatory measures. 
(Karli, 2008, 25.)
Finally, the SADC, PACP regions and Cameroon 
EPAs provide for appropriate measures to 
be proportional to the violation. However, 
proportionality is not defined which limits its 
legal utility or functionality.
The EPA DS has also been faulted for 
provisions allowing only the winning party to 
retaliate. This goes against the ACP countries’ 
demand for the right to retaliate collectively 
and the experience of developing country 
coalition building in WTO DS. The presence 
of a coalition on the side of a develo-
ping country enhances a country’s chances 
of undermining the power of a dominant 
developed country, accessing legal resources 
and expertise, and discouraging developed 
countries from threatening economic coercion. 
Economic Partnership Agreements are the 
direct result of such coalition building. 
A handful of Latin American Member countries 
(led by Ecuador) joined by the USA were able 
to force the end of the Lomé preferences 
(Abass, 2004; Bown, 2005). 
Overall, EPA DS does little if anything to 
address the problem of effective remedies 
in dispute settlement between developed 
and developing countries.  As demonstrated 
by the gambling case between Antigua 
and Barbuda and the US, retaliatory trade 
measures are hardly viable options for 
developing countries wronged by large 
industrial countries. For example, if Mauritius 
were to suspend concessions and obligations 
to the EU as a result of the EU’s breach of 
some trade obligation, it is Mauritius that 
would suffer greater economic damage from 
such suspension. This renders suspension of 
concessions an ineffective remedy for many 
developing countries. This is the context 
within which developing countries have been 
calling for alternative measures to suspension 
of concessions (e.g. financial compensation). 
Whilst  EPA DS introduces potentially useful 
remedies, the symmetrical nature of such 
remedies renders them effectively similar to 
the prevailing WTO DS.
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The Cotonou Partnership Agreement contains 
non-execution clauses, which allow the EU to 
unilaterally suspend any concessions under 
the agreement, including trade concessions 
(Articles 96 and 97). Article 96 allows for the 
imposition of sanctions in the case of failure, 
“to fulfil an obligation stemming from respect 
for human rights, democratic principles and 
the rule of law,” while Article 97 allows for 
sanctions in serious cases of corruption. The 
EU has transferred the substance of these 
articles into interim EPAs and the CARIFORUM 
EPA despite strong objections from the ACP 
group (African Union, 2008). Even before the 
EPAs were concluded or initialled, the EU had 
invoked Articles 96 and 97 of the CPA twice: 
in 2001 against Zimbabwe in response to 
alleged electoral fraud, and in 2007 against 
Fiji following a military coup, suspending 
development aid (Bilal and Lui, 2009).
The ‘general exception’ clauses in virtually all 
the EPAs reserves the rights of the parties to 
suspend preferences under a wide a range of 
circumstances going beyond those permissible 
under the WTO (e.g. protection of human, 
animal and plant life). It extends to purely 
political or non-trade related cases that would 
be difficult to defend at the WTO.  
The non-execution clause in the EPAs is at 
least partly legally and developmentally 
problematic. Firstly, the ACP group maintains 
that political cooperation with the EU is 
distinct and separate from trade relations 
and the two should be kept apart and were 
legally kept apart under the CPA. Economic 
Partnership Agreements are provided for under 
Article 37 of the CPA and not Articles 96 or 97. 
Accordingly, Articles 96 and 97 of the CPA do 
not apply to EPAs (ACP, 2007). 
Secondly, it is not clear that a WTO Panel would 
uphold a suspension of concessions over non-
trade related issues, such as obtained in Fiji 
or Zimbabwe. Were such suspensions to occur 
in the transition period, the validity of such 
an EPA, if it were a bilateral one, would be 
uncertain. As Bilal and Lui (2009, 32) argue, 
“the ability to suspend trade liberalisation 
would not satisfy the requirements to 
eliminate tariffs on substantially all trade in 
Article XXIV”, considering the symmetrical 
nature of the tariff liberalization commitments 
between the EU and ACP countries. Given the 
asymmetrical nature of trade liberalization 
between the EU and ACP countries, if the EU 
were to suspend a significant value or volume 
of its preferences either to an ACP country 
in a bilateral or regional EPA within the next 
15 years, it is not at all clear that the FTA 
would meet the terms of GATT Article XXIV on 
substantially all trade. It is equally unclear 
what the impact of such suspension would be 
on regional FTAs.
In spite of the legal and development 
challenges posed by the non-execution 
clause, the inclusion of such a clause is not 
uncommon although it is generally governed 
by public international law, especially the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. This 
is the context in which the CPA provided for 
such a clause in respect of human rights and 
democracy. Dispute Settlement Understanding 
jurisprudence has shown that panels and 
Appellate Boards have explicitly and implicitly 
considered this Convention in the past.  In 
spite of the ACP countries’ contestation of the 
inclusion of such a clause in EPAs, it might be 
permissible under WTO law. Notably, this is not 
the first time that the EU is employing a similar 
clause in its trade relations with developing 
countries. For instance, the EU-Mexico FTA 
contains a similar clause. Although Mexico has 
challenged the inclusion of the non-execution 
clause politically, it has so far not been 
legally challenged. 
6. THE NON-EXECUTION CLAUSE
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7. CONCLUSION
The study examined the legal and developmental 
implications of five fundamental provisions of 
the EPAs with a view to assessing whether or not 
they were relatively more restrictive than those 
provided for under WTO or necessary for 
development, financial and trade interests 
of ACP countries. It found that all the EPAs 
contain more restrictive legal provisions 
than necessary for WTO compatibility or 
developmentally desirable for ACP countries. 
Specifically, the EPAs have been shown 
as relatively more restrictive than legally 
necessary or compared to like FTAs in respect 
of interpretation of GATT Article XXIV on 
substantially all trade. They have also been 
shown to contain WTO-plus obligations, such as 
MFN and standstill clauses, that are potentially 
detrimental to the development, financial and 
trade interests of some ACP countries. Finally, 
the EPA dispute settlement system has been 
shown to be relatively lacking in special and 
differential treatment provisions compared to 
the WTO dispute settlement system. 
In summary, it has been argued that the WTO-
plus provisions of EPAs and their restrictive 
interpretations of WTO rules pose serious 
systemic challenges to the multilateral 
trading system, particularly the purposes 
and functions of the Enabling Clause and the 
underlying principle of special and differential 
treatment. The legal design of the EPAs 
undermines this principle and diminishes the 
policy space or flexibility available to ACP EPAs 
in dealing with challenges inherent in their 
levels of economic development such as the 
need for infant industry protection, revenues 
from trade taxes, etc. Specifically, the EPA 
MFN clause threatens to undermine the role of 
the Enabling Clause in governing South-South 
trade. It also imposes unnecessary constraints 
on trade relations between the ACP countries 
and other industrialised countries.
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In light of the foregoing discussion, this article 
makes the following recommendations regar-
ding pending issues or continued negotiations 
of EPAs.
1. African, Caribbean and Pacific countries 
should seek the elimination of the MFN 
clause in the final negotiations on full EPAs. 
Failing that, major trading economies in the 
MFN provisions in EPAs should be redefined to 
exclude developing countries. Any definition 
of major trading economies that includes 
developing countries potentially conflicts with 
the purposes and functions of the Enabling 
Clause in governing South-South trade. 
2. The Economic Partnership Agreement stand- 
still clause is a WTO-plus provision. It 
would be in the development, financial and 
trade interests of ACP countries to seek its 
elimination in the final negotiations on full 
EPAs. A second best alternative in this respect 
would be for the ACP countries to freeze their 
tariffs at bound rather than applied levels 
and freeze tariffs relating only to products 
committed for liberalization as opposed 
to all products as provided for in some 
interim EPAs.
3. Consistent with many other FTAs (e.g. EU-
Chile, EU-Czech, EU-Morocco, EU-South 
Africa, US-Australia, US-Morocco) and in the 
interests of their development, trade and 
financial needs, ACP countries should consider 
excluding any sensitive sectors or products 
from liberalization commitments. These 
should be defined in both ‘static’ (short term, 
e.g. food security, infant industry protection) 
and ‘dynamic’ (long term – e.g. industrial 
or national development) terms. This could 
be considerably more than their present 
exclusions in interim EPAs. 
4. For purposes of compliance with GATT 
Article XXIV, 80 percent liberalization by 
ACP countries (either in regional groupings 
or as individual countries in bilateral EPAs) 
within 15 years would appear to suffice for 
compatibility with GATT Article XXIV, if the 
EU liberalizes 100 percent of its trade with 
any given ACP country configuration at the 
outset. This would amount to 90 percent 
coverage of the trade between the parties 
in 15 years. All the interim EPAs and the 
CARIFORUM EPA provide for at least 80 percent 
liberalization within 15 years by the ACP bloc 
and 100 percent immediate liberalization by 
the EU barring transitory periods for rice 
and sugar. Any liberalization commitment 
by the ACP group beyond the 80 percent 15-
year mark would appear deeper than legally 
necessary compared to many prevailing 
FTAs.  In the interests of their development, 
trade and financial needs, these countries 
could seek indefinite phase-out periods for 
liberalization commitments beyond the 80 
percent 15-year watershed or subject such 
commitments to tariff reduction rather than 
elimination.  This would be consistent with 
other North-South FTAs, particularly those 
involving the US.
5. The Economic Partnership Agreement dispute 
settlement should be no stricter than the WTO 
dispute settlement. Developing countries face 
considerable challenges utilizing the WTO DS 
system. A more stringent system than the 
WTO’s would only make things worse for the 
ACP countries. They could consider choice of 
forum provisions in the EPA dispute settlement 
systems with the WTO system as a potential 
alternative option. This could enhance the 
symmetry of the EPA DS mechanism given the 
economic disparities between the EU and the 
ACP regions. 
6. If ACP countries choose to conclude agree-
ments on services and investments, it would 
be in their development, trade and financial 
interests to demand special and differential 
treatment as provided by GATS Article V in 
respect of services.  As GATS provides for MFN 
treatment in RTAs, it would also be in their 
interests to consider the items they might 
exempt from MFN provisions of the GATS. The 
ACP countries would also benefit from an MFN 
clause with both pre- and post-establishment 
provisions as inspired by GATS Article II.
8. RECOMMENDATIONS
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